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Abstract 
 
Dragana Lassiter: Frictionless Expectations: When Bioethics Travels to Serbia 
(Under the direction of Margaret Wiener) 
 
  
 Over the last seven years, the European Union (EU) has promoted the 
institutionalization of bioethics in Serbia as part of EU citizenship. This paper looks at 
what it is about bioethics that makes it possible to take its universal application for 
granted and why are actors such as the Consul of Europe invested in transporting 
bioethics from their origins in the United States and Western Europe to Serbia. I start by 
examining discourse around institutionalized bioethics that makes transplanting of its 
ideas and practices appear unproblematic. Drawing on the concept of audit cultures and 
looking at bioethics as an audit mechanism, I show how promoting bioethics becomes an 
ethical end in itself. Finally, I consider how Westerners have historically construed Serbia 
as backwards, savage, and violent. I suggest that promoting bioethics as a condition of 
EU citizenship might be a means of making ethical subjects or of civilizing Serbia.  
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Introduction  
 
 
 
 
Over the last seven years, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations 
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have been active in Serbia 
in promoting a set of ideas and practices in science and medicine known as bioethics. The 
United Nations and the Consul of Europe, an organization invested in fostering of 
democratic principles based on human rights among the EU member states, have 
undertaken a number of tasks. They have helped train a multidisciplinary group of 
scholars in bioethics, encouraged and funded the foundation of hospital ethics 
committees, organized conferences on bioethics, and assisted in the incorporation of 
bioethics into medical school curricula. Working with the University of Belgrade School 
of Medicine and the Serbian Ministry of Health, in 2008, these actors have assisted in 
establishing the Serbian Bioethics Committee. The committee was composed of an 
interdisciplinary group of Serbian scholars charged with deliberating and steering 
reflection and legislation on the effects of biotechnology upon all aspects of human life in 
Serbia. This new branch of expertise intended to replace the existing Serbian medical 
ethics with principles more attuned to issues of global health and transnational research.  
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 In pressing Serbia to make changes to the way that science and medicine are 
practiced, to adapt an ethical framework for approaching issues in these two fields, and to 
change policy in order to standardize these practices, the Consul of Europe and UNESCO 
representatives have often linked bioethics to a process they call “democratization.” In 
various documents I have reviewed, interviews given to local newspapers and conference 
presentations, actors involved refer to the UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics 
and Human Rights of 2005- a pledge to assist institutionalization of bioethics in countries 
undergoing democratization, linking bioethics to democracy through a discourse on 
human dignity and individual rights presumably neglected by the Communist regime. In 
the name of democracy, various organizations and the EU, along with bioethics, have 
been promoting economic decentralization and the movement of power and capital from 
the state to non-governmental and private actors. 
 Scholarly and legal discourse often portrays the process of translating the ideas 
and practices of bioethics as a simple transplantation of a universal called bioethics. 
Intrigued by the way people involved in the promotion of bioethics imagine its practices 
and ideas to travel, I interviewed a bioethics professor from the Philosophy Department at 
the University of Belgrade. My interlocutor was helpful but concerned about the topic of 
my research. Alluding to a number of scandals involving physicians who had accepted 
bribes from newly present international pharmaceutical companies to prescribe untested 
or unapproved medications, my interlocutor insisted that Serbs are “morally primitive.” 
“There is no bioethics in Serbia,” he said, “If you want to study bioethics, you should go 
to one of the Western countries.” His comment illuminates how the Serbian transition to 
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democracy, which includes pressures to privatize and open its market to international 
pharmaceutical companies and which evokes the historical division between East and 
West Europe, is a fraught process. Moreover, his comment and the context discussed 
above raise several concerns that I will unravel in this paper. What is the abstract notion 
of bioethics that has come to inform the practices associated with new biotechnologies in 
Serbia, as well as to saturate professional and public discussions in medicine? How did 
the ideas and practices of bioethics come to be? What is it about bioethics as it developed 
in the country of its origin that makes it possible to take its universal application for 
granted? And importantly, why are actors such as the Consul of Europe invested in 
transporting them from their origins in the United States and Western Europe to Serbia? 
How did Serbia become a target of their investments? In this paper, I set up an 
interpretative framework for looking at these questions using existing scholarship.  
 I begin by looking at the history of bioethics as a discipline and a set of practices, 
and examine how it came to be linked to democratic states and a process called 
“democratization” through the discourse of rights. I show how we may apply insights 
from Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholarship to challenge the rights discourse 
and the link between bioethics and democracy. This insight shows how bioethics 
circumscribes ethics, and how bioethics is compatible with the view of scientific progress 
as an unquestionable good. STS scholarship can address the criticism that bioethics 
serves institutions and markets in which it is embedded (Petryna 2006; Churchill 1999; 
Farmer 2005; Scheper-Hughes 2005; Rose 2007). The modern ontology and the resulting 
separation of nature and culture, on which the STS analysis draws, however, is less 
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helpful for examining why the EU construes Serbia as in need of bioethics. To help 
explain why the EU is invested in making Serbia the new grounds for bioethics, I turn to 
Nikolas Rose’s (1996; 2007) discussion of the new modes of governing that have become 
dominant in Western Europe and North America. Such modes of governing operate 
through the mechanisms of audits and standards. By treating bioethics as an audit 
mechanism, I show how promoting bioethics becomes an ethical end in itself. Finally, 
moved by the discussion of primitivism and moral hierarchy which my interlocutor 
evoked, I consider how Westerners have historically construed Serbia as backwards, 
savage, and violent. I suggest that promoting bioethics as a condition of EU citizenship 
might be a means of making ethical subjects or of civilizing Serbia.  
 The larger story that I hope to trace by engaging this scholarship is how bioethics 
as a presumed universal is imagined to be able to travel unimpeded and unchanged by the 
new context into which it is transported. I try to draw out what is particular about 
bioethics and Serbia as the new ground that enables such an imaginary. Drawing on Anna 
Tsing’s (2004) work, I suggest that ethnographic research looking at bioethics in Serbia 
can show that the movement of ideas and practices across cultural and political 
boundaries does not proceed unimpeded by particular local historical conjectures.  
   
   
  
  
 
               
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
  History 
 
 
  
 Bioethics is a branch of ethics. For the purpose of this paper, when I speak of 
ethics, I mean the responsibility and accountability of individuals and institutions for 
their own actions and for the world these actions produce. Bioethics emerged in the 
United States in 1960s as a social movement responding to a sense of change and anxiety 
over novel scientific interventions, a perceived dehumanization in medicine though the 
pervasiveness of new technologies, and the discovery of abusive research practices 
(Rosenberg 1999; Jonsen 1998; Rothman 2003). 
 In the 1960s, advances in diagnostic technology, reproductive and transplant 
technology, as well as a restructuring of hospitals in the United States prompted public 
criticism of deteriorating patient-physician relationships that increasingly were becoming 
mediated by impersonal machines (Jonsen 1998:11) and diagnostic technology that had 
become more valued than the patient’s narration of illness (Rothman 2003:142). Medical 
technologies of the 1960s and 1970s undeniably shaped the emergence of bioethics by 
               
  
6 
bringing to public attention to debates over how to distribute the benefits of that 
technology and how to cope with their effects on the shifting boundaries of life and death. 
Dzur (2002) points out the significance of Shana Alexander’s 1962 Life magazine article, 
“They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies,” which described how Swedish Hospital in Seattle 
had developed criteria for allocating hemodialysis machines, a scare resource at the time. 
In 1974, Fox identified some of the emerging technologies implicated in the constitution 
of bioethics:  
 
“Actual and anticipated developments in genetic engineering and counseling, life 
support systems, birth technology, population control, the implantation of human, 
animal, and artificial organs, as well as in the modification and control of human 
thought and behavior are principal foci of concern. Within this framework, special 
attention is concentrated on the implications of amniocentesis (a procedure for 
detecting certain genetic disorders in utero), in vitro fertilization, the prospect of 
cloning (the asexual reproduction of an unlimited number of genetically identical 
individuals from a single parent), organ transplantation, the use of the artificial 
kidney machine, the development of an artificial heart, the modalities of the 
intensive care unit, the practice of psychosurgery, and the introduction of 
psychotropic drugs.” (Fox 1976:230). 
 
 Technological advancements such as transplantation, reproductive technologies 
and hemodialysis spurred the creation of numerous national committees and legislation to 
grapple with issues such as when to turn off ventilators, how to distribute hemodialysis 
machines, and what kind of life should depend on hemodialysis machines, new 
pharmaceuticals, and exposure to invasive diagnostic technologies promote (Fox 
1976:232). Some historians, such as Rothman (1999), argue that these technological 
developments arose in the context of an already deteriorated sense of intimacy in doctor-
patient relationships, as medical training was re-oriented towards increasing 
               
  
7 
specialization (Rosenberg 1999:33). Medical advances, in this view, simply made 
manifest larger social issues. Others contend that technologies shaped social contexts and 
ethical sensibilities. Some scholars might argue (Jasanoff 2004, 2005; Franklin & Lock 
2001) that the most appropriate perspective though which to view the emergence of 
bioethics and biomedical technology is the one of co-production in which biology and 
discourse emerge together (Franklin & Lock 2001; Lock 2002). Questions of life and 
particular ethical problems did not precede or follow the changes to bodies enabled by 
new medical technologies. New ethical concerns and a new biology developed together. 
 In 1966, Henry Beecher, a professor of anesthesiology at Harvard University 
published an article in the New England Journal of Medicine entitled “Ethics and Clinical 
Research.” The article discusses some abusive practices in clinical research, such as the 
injection of seventeen senile hospital patients with cancerous cells in order to study 
immunological responses, or the insertion of catheters into the bladders of twenty four 
newborns followed by taking a series of x-rays in order to study the process of voiding 
(Rothman 2003:16). Unregulated experimentation on human beings was not a new 
practice, but the context had changed. Rothman argues that until World War II, medical 
research was almost always therapeutic in intent and executed on a small scale, as a 
“cottage industry” (1999:18), with a few physicians working on their own and carrying 
out experiments on themselves, their family members, and friends. In the 1960s, the 
horrors of large-scale Nazi experimentations during WWII loomed as a dangerous 
prospect in any larger scale research. Furthermore, a human rights movement was gaining 
strength in the later 1960s in response to the publication of abusive research practices and 
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the historical exploitation of minorities, mentally disabled, poor, and incarcerated 
subjects. The discovery of the Tuskegee study, in which hundreds of impoverished 
African Americans with syphilis were given a placebo instead of penicillin, was a 
galvanizing moment for the federal regulation of clinical research. These abusive 
research practices linked several studies to the discourse of rights (Rothman 2003:10; 
Jonsen 1998: xii), transferring discussion of research ethics from the intimacy of 
scientific institutions into media, political forums, and courtrooms. 
 The configuring of ethical issues in terms of patients’ rights and of setting limits 
to experimentation in the name of science drew the attention of the US Congress, which 
started to call upon experts not directly engaged with biosciences, such as philosophers, 
ethicists, lawyers, and social scientists (Jonsen 1998: xii). Congress set up a National 
Commission to explore medical and research ethics. Federal regulations resulting from 
this commission limited the once considerable freedom of researchers (Rothman 
2003:10). Investigating problems that arose from medical practice and clinical research, 
bioethical questions gathered together an interdisciplinary group of scholars teaching and 
researching ethics to serve on new bioethics committees set up nationwide in hospitals 
and research institutions or to work as consultants in clinical settings (Rosenberg 
1999:39-40). In 1979, philosophers Tom Beauchamp and James Childress produced the 
first edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, a textbook charting theoretical ground for 
bioethics and marking in significant ways its formalization as a discipline.  
 Although its practitioners come from multiple disciplinary backgrounds, 
bioethical theory is strikingly uniform. It embraces a philosophical and legal perspective 
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grounded in abstract Western liberal principles of autonomy, privacy, benevolence, 
nonmaleficence, and social distribution of medical benefits and risks. Bioethics takes the 
presumed universal rights of the individual as its primary unit of analysis. These rights 
are balanced against the greater good of society. Treating morality as universal, this 
philosophical approach has been marked by the rationalization of ethical norms and 
prescriptive behaviors that define the standard for a good physician, including patient-
physician relationship and truth telling. Bioethical principles are also supposed to guide 
how to protect human subjects in research, how to prioritize transplant organ recipients, 
and how aggressive life prolonging measures should be. 
 In the last three decades, bioethical principles have become embedded in technical 
literature, research protocols, and institutional review boards. From a once marginal 
social movement in the 1960’s, bioethics has transformed into a bourgeoning body of 
professional expertise. In his account of biopower, Foucault (1990) addresses the 
constitution of modern states through increasing focus on the management of the 
biological existences of populations, which entails controlling the processes of 
reproduction, mortality, and life expectancy. In this view, the state’s investment in 
promoting and legalizing bioethical principles can be viewed as an extension of 
biopower. More than simply being interested in “making live and letting die,” the 
imperative Foucault (1990) ascribes to the modern state, sovereign power has become 
engaged in deciding how to achieve those goals ethically.  
 Now an established discipline with its own set of competencies, training practices, 
and textbooks, bioethics has become indispensible to the working of hospitals and 
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research centers in North America and Western Europe. Bioethicists are called to resolve 
ethical issues that arise in the delivery of healthcare. What this means in practice is they 
seem to ensure that sufficient information is provided to patients to enable them to make 
autonomous choices. The goal is to protect patients from becoming victims of patronizing 
decisions by their healthcare providers. Increasingly, bioethicists also serve as facilitators 
of public discussions involving controversies in science and medicine, such as the 
concern with human genome sequencing, as their expertise is solicited by the media and 
before congressional legislative committees (Churchill 1999:254). Both private and 
public funding for bioethics-related research abound (Churchill 1999:253). Biotech 
companies increasingly employ bioethicists as they try to present themselves as good 
citizens (Ecks 2008) to potential consumers. By setting aside five percent of its budget 
for the study of the ethical implications of genetic research in 1995, the National Human 
Genome Research Institute created the most extensive ongoing bioethics research project 
to date.    
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Bioethics and Democracy 
 
 
Not all scientific and medical institutions and pharmaceutical companies employ 
bioethicists. But those that do not, employ bioethical principles. Informed consent, a 
document exemplifying the bioethical principle of autonomy, has become a normative 
part of the clinical encounter for people undergoing any invasive medical procedure, 
taking part in clinical research, and donating body tissue. In recent years, use of such 
consent has been extended from medical practice and research, to be incorporated into 
regulations governing the protection of personal information and the use of human tissue 
and genetic information (Manson & O’Neill 2007). Informed consent takes as its 
fundamental principle respect for the autonomy of the individual human being to decide 
her own course of life. The right to choose is linked in bioethics literature to dignity and 
to the unique capacities of humans to reflect upon their own existence. Choice is thus 
perceived to be an expression of personhood.  
 The other side of the principle of autonomy is the demand that healthcare 
professionals and medical researchers, as administrators of informed consent, do not try 
to constrain anyone’s pre-given right to choose a course of life. Informed consent, more 
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than any other bioethical imperative, elucidates the universal liberal notions of selfhood 
implicit in bioethics. The presumed universality of the autonomous and liberal individual 
coupled with the discourse of rights is how bioethics travels as a transnational imperative. 
This is evident in educational and legal documents such as UNESCO’S Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, in professional literature, and in the 
“Bioethics and Genetic Research” conference presentations held in Serbia in 2010 and 
sponsored by The European Commission’s Steering Committee for Bioethics. The 
UNESCO Declaration emphasizes such humanism in referring to the unique and 
universal human capacity for moral reflection and choice, and insists that the ethical 
issues arising from rapid advances in science “should be examined with the due respect to 
the dignity of the human person,” (unesco. org).  
 Bioethics belongs to a group of disciplines loosely held under the name of 
medical humanism that are concerned with deepening and enriching the self-
understanding and human perspective brought to bear when people confront new 
situations and choices (Belkin 2004:378). The humanization of medicine and science 
through bioethics, by ensuring that the unique human moral ability to reflect upon one’s 
own experiences as just or unjust is given priority over the good inherent in scientific and 
medical goals, has developed through a discourse of rights. If humanization is an abstract 
goal of bioethics, rights are how that goal is achieved through particular forms of 
citizenship. The state needs to be accountable for its workings in order not to be 
paternalistic and make decisions for its citizens, undermining their right to choose. Thus 
the UNESCO Declaration reminds member states that their citizens have a right to 
preserve their human dignity. This discourse of rights also calls on the collective 
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responsibility to distribute benefits, such as the access to the life-prolonging medical 
technologies. In this metaphor, medical interventions concern both the individual body 
and the body politic.  
 As the news from Serbia indicates, there is an unexamined democratic value 
associated with bioethics, such that the United Nations and the Consul of Europe promote 
the bioethics as evidence of “democratization” and a condition of EU citizenship. The 
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights gives special attention 
to building capacities in developing countries to address ethical issues and preserve 
human dignity in the implementation of new medical technologies and human subject 
research. Jasanoff (2005) notes that in the last two decades bioethics has come to occupy 
a prominent position in national political discourse and has been implicated in projects of 
democracy building because of the tight relationship between the state and life sciences. 
People demand that states protect their citizens from potential abuses of medical 
technology. The birth of bioethics overlaps historically with states’ interest in sponsoring 
biomedical advances at the same time as states faces the risk of offending religious 
sensibilities, violating racial and gender inequality (Jasanoff 2005:188). Foucault’s 
(1990) concept of biopower addresses the close relationship between state and life 
sciences, as modern states rule by managing biological lives of its constituents.  Both 
liberal and socialist regimes are modern in the Foucauldian sense, but socialist states do 
not merely regulate scientific research or medical practice. They also employee those 
same researchers and physicians and have a control over knowledge production in 
medicine and science. This has historically led to paternalism, whereby socialist states 
make decisions at their own discretion about the lives of their citizens undermining the 
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notion of a liberal individual that bioethical principles evoke. In order to be a new ground 
for bioethics, a socialist state must be accountable to the public. Demands for state 
accountability and transparency are linked to the origin of bioethics in the United States. 
Thus the Serbian state, emerging from communism, needs to be accountable to the 
Consul of Europe and United Nations in order to ensure transparency and the protection 
of human rights. As a feature of the “democratization” process, the EU expects the 
Serbian state to share its decision-making and economic power with the non-
governmental and private sector, allowing for privatization of healthcare and the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Science and Technology Studies Scholarship 
 
 
Thus far I have examined the history of bioethics and its increasing entanglement with 
rights discourse. I have suggested this entanglement has led bioethics to be linked to 
democracy and thus “democratization” that requires the presence of bioethical practice. 
Yet, many have questioned this connection between democracy and bioethics, noting that 
bioethics can serve the interests of the very institutions from which it is supposed to 
protect people. (Petryna 2006; Churchill 1999; Farmer 2005; Scheper-Hughes 2005; Rose 
2007). “Democratization” in Serbia embodies this contradiction precisely because it 
entails both instituting of bioethical practices and the opening of the market to 
transnational pharmaceutical companies. Many of these companies have exploited the 
economic insecurity of Serbian healthcare professionals in the interest of profit and 
competition through the use of incentives to institutions and individuals to test 
medications without patients’ knowledge or consent or to administer therapy that had not 
been approved for that particular use.  I turn now to scholars in Science and Technology 
Studies whose ontological turn might suggest what it is about bioethics that makes it at 
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once necessary in modern regimes and able to limit issues deemed worthy of ethical 
concerns (Belkin, 2004). Demonstrating how a discourse of rights and choice limits 
ethics in the countries where bioethics is fully developed, this scholarship challenges the 
assumed linkage between democracy and bioethics.  
 In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour (1993) denounces humanism as a 
universal concern by showing that humanism is ontologically contingent: “Modernity is 
often defined in terms of humanism, either as a way of saluting the birth of ‘man’ or as a 
way of announcing his death. But this habit is itself modern…” (Latour 1993:13). Thus 
the humanism on which theory of bioethics hinges, for Latour, is a result of the moderns’ 
denial of the co-emergence of material and natural things with human and religious 
beings (things, humans and God) and their effort to purify the three spheres (things, 
humans and God) into either human or non-human. (Latour 1993:13). In practice, hybrids 
compromised of things, humans, and deities proliferate, but when moderns reflect on 
them, they purify them by presupposing that these three categories have immaculate 
boundaries. Considering things and people as belonging to different spheres of reality 
requires distinct epistemologies. Thus, for moderns, scientists deal with things and social 
scientists deal with people. Science and humanism belong to opposite poles of the 
modern ontology. Claims to knowing the world of the human cannot be reconciled with 
access to the world of material things: what is natural cannot be human.  
 In The Politics of Nature, Latour (2004) expands this argument through a critique 
of political ecology. While political ecology has a hybrid name and in practice mixes 
nature with politics, as a theory, it purifies these two spheres. This is due to the modern 
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tendency to separate facts (which speak for nature) from values (which reflect culturally-
imbued morality and politics). “The tempting aspect of the distinction between facts and 
values lies in its seeming modesty, its innocence, even: scientists define facts, only facts; 
they leave to politicians and moralists the even more daunting task of defining values,” 
(Latour 2004:95). The fact and value division is a symptom of the nature-culture division. 
Scientific facts reflect the state of nature, speak for the material and non-human, and are 
sometimes transcendent. Morality and politics, on the other pole of the nature-culture 
divide, the moderns treated as immanent.  
 Like the analysis of political ecology, a Latourian analysis of bioethics reveals 
that though it at first appears to be a hybrid, bioethics suits modern sensibilities because it 
thrives on the nature-culture divide called into question by scholars such as Latour (1993, 
2004), Haraway (1991, 2007), and Stengers (2005). Bioethics places ethics in the realm 
of values, a human concern, and relegates fact-making to the sphere of the material, the 
concern of scientists. Instead of including the material and semiotic fact-making that 
science is engaged with, ethics in bioethics surfaces too late, as a humanistic endeavor 
which encourages reflection upon the “implications of science.”  
 Annemarie Mol (2002) more explicitly addresses the fact and value division in the 
institutionalized performance of bioethics. Mol’s (2002) analysis shows that the 
understanding of science and human values resulting from the fact and value division can 
be mobilized to serve the purpose of relentless scientific progress as an unquestionable 
social good. Mol (2002) calls the enfolding of ethical questions as matters of patient 
rights and patients choice the “politics- of- who.” Ethicists and social scientists have 
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contributed to the configuring of moral issues in these terms because of their suspicion of 
the decisions made by healthcare professionals (2002:168). While the “politics-of-who” 
aims to protect patients from the interests of science and medicine, it inadvertently 
stabilizes the power of professionals by granting all the facts to them (Mol, 2002: 170). 
The “politics-of-who” hinges on the obligation of healthcare professionals to present 
information that is presumably true and neutral. In doing so it relegates concern with 
“technicalities” (Mol 2002:171) to scientists and healthcare professionals. Questions such 
as which facts might be pertinent to the diagnosis of a particular disease, what machines 
should be put to use, and how their used should be to paid for (Mol 2002:171) have 
escaped the “politics-of-who.” Granting facts to the professionals obscures the 
“practicalities, power plays, traditions” which reveal the implicit values residing inside 
facts. (Mol 2002:171).  
 The distinction between fact and value informs the performance of bioethics in 
hospitals in the United States. In practice, bioethicists mitigate clinical problems by 
serving on committees or as consultants to hospital staff or administrators. For example, a 
bioethicist might be paged when a middle-aged woman refuses a life saving treatment. 
Emphasizing the principle of autonomy, bioethicists make sure that the woman is 
competent and has thought through the risks associated with her choice. Mediating 
between physicians and patients, the ethics committee member will present the medical 
facts to the woman. Bioethicist will explain, “if you refuse this treatment, you might die 
in the next month.” In the face of these facts, the woman is given a choice. But inquiry 
into what to do will never lead behind the making of the facts presented. There will be no 
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discussion of biomedicine’s historic tendency to align its goals with the natural 
characteristics of the body (Mol 2002:173) whereby improving physical health or legal 
responsibility trump all other concerns. There will also be no recognition of how 
institutional values and arrangements have stabilized the treatment as life saving, or of 
the practically contingent work of diagnosing, such as decisions over which tools to use 
to visualize a lesion. 
 Scientific truth falls outside the consideration of bioethics. It is a concern only 
when it touches the life of a “human subject.” The ethical moment for bioethics is the 
moment in which scientific facts and personal histories meet in such a way to cause 
discomfort. It is a non-routine moment in which science cannot proceed as usual due to 
the capacity of human beings to reflect on their experiences. Ethics is invoked when the 
woman refuses treatment, not if, like majority of patients, she goes along with the 
doctor’s recommendation. Issues arise when patients’ morals do not align with objectives 
of science and medicine. Hence, standardized hospital practices do not require bioethics. 
Bioethicists are not called to the pathology lab where pathologists Monday through 
Friday make decisions on what constitutes a deadly lesion. This is a materially contingent 
practice that involves choices over what kind of machines to use. It may be difficult to 
line up the lesion of a particular patient with the picture of the standard lesion. 
Translations abound and are not always smooth.  But bioethicists do not take this into 
consideration. They are only paged to come to a bedside or a conference room to discuss 
the implications of such non-negotiable facts (a deadly lesion) for a particular patient and 
her family. Bioethics thus circumscribes the space of ethics because it pre-determines the 
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moments of ethical concern and thus isolates when choice is made (Mol 2002:169): not in 
cancer clinical trials where five- year survival is taken as a fixed statistical variable and 
an unquestioned good, but in a patient’s refusal to undergo chemotherapy.  
 Turning to a discussion of bioethics in research, Mol (2002) shows how clinical 
trials, the instrument of fact-making in medicine, require scientists to negotiate their 
design. Epidemiologists must choose a large enough population to sample, one with a lot 
of disease. They also have to establish a target population. But targets could be multiple. 
Besides medical information such as age and sex, researchers often use race and ethnicity 
when selecting target population. These are value-laden practices. Trials are translated 
into facts that determine the type of treatment to be used. If the population consists of 
women, being a woman might become a risk factor for a certain condition. Women could 
be getting annual screenings based on a perceived risk. Women become associated with 
their medical risks. But what is good for one population may confer little advantage to an 
individual and vice versa. The numbers that indicate success in population terms, such as 
a five- year survival rate, may not be indicators of success for an individual. The question 
of what kind of five years depends on the individual.   
 Scientist and physicians are well aware of these uneasy translations and the way 
they are laden with values. In clinical trials, cancer treatment protocols are standardized 
and do not include a patient’s age. They are altered on the basis of someone’s overall 
health.  But there is an implicit urgency in treating younger people more aggressively. 
This often requires translating “overall health” into age. Doctors might also suggest a 
more aggressive treatment if the patient is a young mother. Mothers should be treated 
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more aggressively because they have children to raise. Decisions over how to achieve a 
longer life for a mother, given that the trials do not include mother as a category, are 
contingent. The value in taking a riskier approach when treating the mother of young 
children translates smoothly into the administration of chemotherapy. What kind of 
chemotherapy mothers get becomes a standard in the form of a hospital chemotherapy 
protocol that is presented as unproblematic. When bioethicists are called to the bedside to 
ensure that a young mother knows all of the potential consequences of her decision not to 
continue treatment, all of these contingencies and values are presented as non-negotiable 
facts. While in the hospital and in clinical trials the categories of “the individual” and 
“the population” are sometimes conflated and at other times elegantly differentiated or 
translated into one another, the principle of autonomy maintains that ethical decisions are 
only made when an individual chooses her own course of life.  
 An ontological approach to bioethics reveals that the fact-value dualism implicit 
in the theory of bioethics consolidates the power of facts as given and non-negotiable 
and, importantly, renders morality impotent in the face of established facts (Latour 
2004:233). Bioethics relegates ethics to the aestheticization of medicine and science, an 
afterthought that does not threaten the transcendence of nature and its true reflection in 
science, the pre-human realm. In line with this logic, value is added to science when we 
reflect upon its otherwise non-negotiable and timeless reservoir of certainties. Due to the 
fact-value division, within bioethics, ethical dilemmas become merely the “implications 
of science and medicine,” a response to the impact of scientific advances, a value-
saturated human experience. This allows bioethics to expertly manage ethical issues in 
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hospitals and clinical research. Thus, bioethics serves as a manager of the fact-value 
encounters and a domain of instrumental decisions. Bioethical principles can help absolve 
institutions of ethical responsibility by presenting ethical dilemmas as the choice of 
autonomous individuals. Oriented towards managing clashes between scientists and the 
facts they represent and patients and the value they add, bioethics seems to have the job 
of resolving problems and speeding up the presumably value-free scientific and clinical 
agenda. Ethical issues are considered resolved when institutions are absolved of their 
responsibility to individuals or to the public they are supposed to serve.  
 Thus the ontological turn in STS scholarship illuminates how bioethics has come 
to serve institutions such as hospitals and pharmaceutical companies. It challenges the 
linking of bioethics to democracy and the promotion of bioethics in countries where 
public is conceived of as inadequately protected against the interest of science and 
medicine and the state as their patron. This insight from STS can illuminate the 
contradictions which my interlocutor in Serbia raised by showing why it is that bioethics 
can be both indispensible and undermined at once. Promoting bioethics as a set of 
practices and ideas in Serbia comes with new economic and political arrangements that 
make it possible to circumscribe ethics.  
 Furthermore, by insisting on a frame that does not separate nature and culture, the 
STS approach asks bioethics to consider what Mol (2002) calls “technicalities,” the 
material practices in science and medicine, a concern which bioethics has relegated to the 
scientists and physicians. Latour’s (1993, 2004) and Mol’s (2002) work raise the question 
of how ethical concerns could be re-shaped and expanded if bioethicists would not limit 
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ethics to a reflection on the established practices of science. The dissolution of the fact 
and value divide that Latour (2004) and Mol (2002) call for would require bioethics to 
dispense with its traditional tools of thinking that evoke a particular notion of a human 
that, as my discussion on the history of bioethics and humanist discourse in Serbia shows, 
the universal principles in bioethics take for granted. The focus on the universal liberal 
human, marked by a unique capacity for reflection and ethical reasoning, has encouraged 
the universal application of bioethics, in which its movement to different cultural and 
political contexts is imagined as unproblematic.  If bioethics was to concern itself with 
both sides of the nature-culture divide, instead of playing out at patient’s bedside, the 
ethical drama would shift to include the pathology lab. The “politics of who” that enfolds 
between the two poles of the fact and value divide with physicians standing for science, 
and patients standing for human experience, would include the machines we use, images 
we make, and bacteria we involve in the making of medical treatment and new science. 
Expanding the circle of relevant actors in bioethics to non-humans would require 
bioethics to shift from dealing only with humanist discourse to looking at practices that 
bring these actors together at a particular moment.  The analysis of modern ontology that 
STS scholarship provides thus can serve as a counter-claim to two universalisms evoked 
in the promotion of bioethics in Serbia: bioethics itself and the process of 
democratization. However, conceptualizing bioethics in terms of a modernist ontology 
does not address the questions of why Serbia needs bioethics in the first place, and the 
degree of difference that makes bioethics a legitimate tool in a transition to democracy 
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and in seeking EU citizenship. To help unravel this issue, on the next few pages I turn to 
a different theoretical framework. 
Historically, Western Europe has constructed Serbia as part of the backwards and 
savage Balkans and Eastern Europe (Mazower 2000; Wolff 1994) whose imaginary 
boundaries have caused anxiety among Western intellectuals and politicians over the 
extent to which this area can be considered European at all, rather than Asian. But the 
communism of Yugoslavia was a modern project. Twentieth century socialism and 
capitalism shared similar utopian desires for social arrangements achieved through a 
particular coupling of economic and political power (Susan Buck-Morss 2002). Over the 
50 years of its existence, the Yugoslav state thoroughly modernized medicine in Serbia. It 
thus would be difficult to claim that the nature-culture boundaries of Serbian biomedicine 
differ from those in the United States or Western Europe, places where bioethics is native 
and its practices and ideas embedded in institutions such as hospitals and research center. 
Hence, in what follows I evoke a different theoretical framework in order to address the 
question of what makes it possible to construe Serbia as in need of bioethics. Drawing on 
Nikolas Rose’s notion of “advanced liberal democracies” and Marylin Strathern’s (2000) 
concept of audit cultures I explain how Serbia could appear different to Western Europe. 
Though this difference does not neatly align with the dichotomy between modern 
Western Europe and backwards Eastern Europe, the politics of promoting bioethics in 
Serbia resonates with the centuries old ethical project of civilizing Serbia.  The fall of the 
iron curtain, Serbia’s more recent history of war in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Serbian 
government’s resistance to acknowledge its role in the resulting genocide, have greatly 
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delayed the transition period and re-invigorated the moral discourse that construes Serbia 
as primitive, violent, and abusive to human rights. Such circumstances can explain why 
the issue of bioethics is particularly political in Serbia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Audit Regimes 
 
 
 
 In The Death of The Social, Nikolas Rose addresses how the privatization of 
welfare and the marketization of healthcare in Western Europe and North American have 
led to new forms of governing in which the social does not figure as prominently as it 
once did: “The social is no longer the target or objective of the strategies of the 
government ” (Rose 1996:327). Instead, management of public services is now built upon 
models from the private sector. This entails new relationships between clients and service 
providers as well as more emphasis on the need for individuals to take responsibility for 
their lives (Rose 1996:327). In the states that Rose calls “ advanced liberal democracies” 
the power of the state to manage health and reproduction has devolved to semi-
autonomous regulatory bodies, professional groups, and private corporations (Rose 
2007:3-4). By contrast, Serbian healthcare is still largely centrally controlled by the state. 
The EU requires that the state relinquish some of its decision-making power to 
independent committees, such as the Serbian Bioethics Committee and a private 
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healthcare sector. The founding of bioethics committees in hospitals and among 
professional groups, such as the Serbian Association of Geneticists, is meant to grant 
non-state actors some of the decisions-making power in science and healthcare. 
 Another side of the transformation is occurring at the level of the individual, as 
the EU requires Serbian government to draft a patient bill of rights and it encourages and 
expects various NGOs and professional organizations to empower patients to take 
responsibility for their own wellbeing through education and public campaigns. 
Corruption in healthcare that the EU perceives to stem from the paternalistic relationship 
between healthcare providers and patients is one of the most concerning aspects of the 
Serbian transition to the EU. A committee for corruption now has a hotline where citizens 
can anonymously report instances of, for example, being charged a fee in order to get any 
information from a physician about their health status. The new governing of healthcare 
creates new experts and forms of certification. As Rose (2007) shows, bioethical 
authority is indispensible to “advanced liberal democracies.” It both guides patients and 
consumers of healthcare services through decision-making processes (Rose 2007) in the 
increasingly complex and parceled landscape of healthcare, at the same time as it 
promotes responsibility of the individuals for their own health.   
 The new modes of governance in “advanced liberal democracies” operate through 
regimes of accountability and transparency such as standards and audits (Rose 2007:4). 
Marilyn Strathern (2000) calls these regimes of accountability “audit cultures.” 
Management practices derived from protocols of financial accountability, audits have 
acquired the force of a cultural movement, turning into patterned and ubiquitous 
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bureaucratic performances central to the working of all kinds of institutions (Strathern 
2000: 2-4). The need to transplant practices and ideas of bioethics to Serbia and make 
them a common feature of the way medical and research institutions operate is part of 
increasing accountability, transparency, routinization and standardization of operations in 
medicine and science. Accountability and transparency are commonly perceived to be 
lacking in socialist regimes where states, at their own discretion, make healthcare 
decisions for their citizens. These two aspects of audit regimes are particularly salient for 
the post-socialist Serbian context as audits formalize practices of reflexivity giving a 
presentation of visibility. Using an organization’s statement of value as an example, 
Strathern (2002) argues that an audit displaces what it stands to represent because, with 
the statement of values in place, no one questions the implicit institutional values. Having 
an audit in place becomes an ethical act in itself that is often taken as the end of 
responsibility: “Documented disclosure (of benefits, of risks) becomes virtuous in itself: 
if a project can self-style itself as transparent, it easily enters the realm of the ethical,” 
(Pottage 1998: 759). ” The most commonly used statement of disclosure in bioethics that 
creates a sense of accountability and transparency is informed consent. Listing all the 
known benefits and risks associated with a medical treatment or research protocol, 
informed consent demonstrates that the institution in question has not hidden any facts 
from patients or research participants. Beyond requiring understanding on the side of the 
person signing, signed and filed consent form in itself is sufficient to relinquish 
institutions of legal responsibility associated with the listed risks. In this way, informed 
consent, as a material form and a practice, rather than its content, becomes an ethical end. 
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 Thus “institutionalizing” ethics in Serbia takes priority over the issues of what is 
ethical and how such ethics fits the context where it is being transplanted. The process of 
making routine and standard the practices of bioethics in Serbia such as the use of 
informed consent is ethical in itself. The EU, a major actor in this process is an ethical 
agent since it promotes bioethics as a way to EU citizenship. The EU, which loosely 
aligns with the Western European values and regimes of governance that Rose calls 
“advanced liberal democracies,” governs through the practice of audits in an accountable 
and ethical manner. To understand why bioethics appears to travel as an unimpeded and 
unchangeable universal, we must examine the practices which actors involved call 
“institutionalization” rather than simply consider the transplantation of the ethical 
principles in themselves.  
 In this light, promoting practices of bioethics in Serbia that match EU bioethical 
standards could be examined as a way of making ethical subjects in Serbia. The need to 
make ethical subjects in Serbia evokes a centuries old discourse of violence and savagery 
that intellectuals, travelers, scholars, nobility and politicians have used to call for a need 
to civilize the Balkans. This discourse has revived following the fall of communism 
(during which a different distinction between East and West was salient) and especially 
following Serbia’s involvement in genocide in Bosnia and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, 
both of which have delayed Serbia’s accession to the EU. 
  From the 14th -19th centuries, Serbia belonged to the Ottoman Empire, a polity 
that encompassed multiethnic and religiously diverse populations in Southeastern Europe. 
For the rest of Europe, the Ottoman Empire’s expansion into Europe was perceived as a 
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threat to Europeanness (Mazower, 2000). From the second half of the 17th century on, 
Catholic Europe increasingly described the Ottoman Empire as tyrannical, illegitimate, 
corrupt and intolerant of religious diversity (Mazower, 2000: xxxiii). Lack of developed 
industry and commercial agriculture, and a large peasant population, contributed to 
constructions of the region as backwards in the narratives of neighboring Austro-
Hungarian travelers and scholars (Mazower, 2000). Used to designate Southeastern 
European countries under the rule of Ottoman Empire, previously called Turkish Europe, 
from the start, the term “Balkans” had negative connotations associated with savagery, 
violence and primitivism. (Mazower, 2000). Contrary to account by intellectuals, political 
officials, and travelers, Mazower (2002) shows that multiethnic populations under the 
rule of the Ottoman Empire co-existed peacefully for many centuries until the Europe-
wide rise of national consciousness at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th 
century. The Ottoman Empire was more tolerant of the variety of languages and religions 
in its territory than the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Mazower, 2000). The wars at the end 
of 19th and early 20th century liberated the small countries of Serbia, Bulgaria, 
Montenegro and Albania from Ottoman rule and resulted in quarrels over territorial 
divisions in the Second Balkan War. 
 Yet, as several scholars have noted, since the 1990s historians and political 
theorists have referred to the supposedly violent history during Ottoman rule and re-
mobilized the metaphor of the violent and savage Balkan in order to explain the 
perceived essential cultural difference of Southeastern Europeans. The authors of Balkan 
as Metaphor explore the construction of the Balkans as Europe’s Other, often refered to 
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as a “fracture zone,” (Goldsworthy 2002: 26) of “ancient hatreds.” (Goldsworthy 2002: 
26). Such discourse about “natural instability” gained new currency with the 1990s wars 
of the Yugoslav succession and the war in Kosovo (Goldsworthy 2002: 27). Though the 
wars were a deliberate and orchestrated violence against civilians by army units 
(Mazower 2000: 148), political actors, media and Western scholars interpreted them as a 
spontaneous eruption of primeval hatreds. The Balkan was a particularly salient metaphor 
that the US media used to justify the NATO bombing of 1999. Envisioning people living 
on the Balkan Peninsula as bound by “ancient hatreds” endemic to the region that “extend 
back in time where it is impossible to look for explanation (Allcock 2000: 2-3)” (or, 
perhaps, not worth looking), this discourse has helped to stabilize indiscriminate violence 
and lack of ethnic and religion tolerance as essential Serbian characteristics.  
 Another overlapping framework through which Serbia’s position vis a vis Europe 
is constructed is that of Eastern Europe. Wolff calls “Eastern Europe” a cultural 
production of Western European writers and scientists in the age of Enlightenment; it 
also stems from the rising orientalism and the cartographic and moral ambiguity of this 
region, located between East and West. (1994:7). During the Enlightenment, evolving 
ideas about civilization and barbarism provided terms of reference for situating Eastern 
Europe as backward on the scale of moral development. (Wolff 1994: 360). Such notions 
were somewhat suspended during the Cold War, when urbanization and industrialization 
changed the Balkan countries. The more active referent of difference became that of 
communism and capitalism. With the fall of communism Eastern European countries 
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were placed in a new hierarchical relationship to the West; now the relevant framework 
refers to development and transition to democracy (Barsegian 2000).  
 The speedy reorientation of Poland towards the EU and NATO, and the granting 
of EU membership to other post- socialist countries make these countries models of 
successful “democratization.” But Serbia’s “transition” did not start until the fall of 
Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in 2000. From 1989-2000, the Serbian government 
participated in wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. In 1995 in Bosnia, unbeknownst to 
the general public in Serbia, the Milosevic abetted the systemic execution of 8000 men 
and boys in Srebrenica. It took years before the Srebrenica genocide made Serbian news 
and many more years before the Serbian government acknowledged these atrocities. 
Numerous other crimes and the general corruption of the Milosevic regime and its 
leftovers have been uncovered since.  For example, privatization of the Serbian 
pharmaceutical industry that the EU has encouraged as a requisite in the process of 
“democratization” has brought wealth into the hands of the political elite in Serbia who, 
through their connections with the socialist regime, managed to buy government-owned 
pharmaceutical companies for nominal amounts of money. Additionally, the Serbian 
government’s failure to cooperate with the EU in prosecuting Serbian war criminals and 
to fight corruption has significantly delayed Serbian entry into the EU. Such corruption 
has generated more mistrust in the Serbian government both by its people and the EU. In 
the eyes of the EU, the lack of transparency that the Serbian government has shown 
makes the promotion of bioethics both more urgent and more complicated. In order to 
show how this recent Serbian history distinguishes Serbia from other countries in the 
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region and makes Serbia a unique ground for bioethics, I turn briefly to considering how 
bioethics in Croatia has developed. 
 While Croatia participated in the wars of Yugoslav succession, the media 
and the public have generally interpreted Croatian participation in wars in Croatia 
and Bosnia as an attempt to break from growing Serbian political dominance and 
Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia. Unlike Serbia, Croatia was not involved in 
ethnic cleansing that gives the politics of life particular salience in Serbia. Though 
Croatia was part of Yugoslavia, until the early 20th century it belonged to the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. As I discussed above, the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
was distinguished from the Ottoman Empire as the ‘civilized’ part of Europe. 
Historical narratives of violence and moral backwardness, as well as recent wars and 
corruption that have shaped the perception of Serbia in the world and the EU’s political 
and ethical projects in Serbia, are not as relevant for the way decisions about life and 
death are made in Croatia.  
 The EU and UNESCO have been active in promoting bioethics in Croatia where 
it has also been linked to Croatia’s “transition to democracy” and EU citizenship. Over 
the past two years, UNESCO has organized and funded research in bioethics in Croatia 
and supported the Ethics Teacher Training Course at Dubrovnik International 
University (unesco. org). However, the process of developing bioethical practices 
and ideas in Croatian medicine and science started much earlier than in Serbia, a 
full fifteen years before the beginning of EU and UNESCO involvement in 
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bioethics in Croatia (Zagorac 2008). Bioethics in Croatia has developed as a 
ground-up initiative, led by Croatian philosophers and physicians in the1990s and 
informed by their collaboration with their colleagues in research centers and 
universities in Germany (Zagorac 2008). As a result, Croatian bioethics has 
adapted a unique direction that my interlocutors in Serbia alerted me to, called 
“the integrative approach.” Over the last decade, Croatia has been heralded as a 
leader in bioethics for Southeastern Europe (Zagorac 2008). The annual Lošinj 
Days of Bioethics conference draws scholars from all over the region. In the 
interviews I conducted as part of my preliminary research, members of the Serbian 
Bioethics Society spoke of the conference as a significant opportunity in their 
professional careers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 There is no simple way in which these social and political circumstances and the 
historical construction of Serbia as backwards, violent, and savage align with the EU’s 
effort to promote bioethics in Serbia. I have suggested that the EUs work in transplanting 
bioethics as a set of practices and ideas to Serbia could be considered as the promotion of 
a system of audits and standards common to “advanced liberal democracies,” (Rose 
1996; 2007). Audits, as Strathern (2000) notes, become an end in themselves: the mere 
act of standardizing and developing audits becomes ethical. Making ethical institutions 
and subjects resonates with the long-standing call to civilize the Balkans, but this should 
in no way imply simple causality.  
In this paper I have used existing scholarship to frame the movement of bioethical 
ideas and practices to Serbia. I have set up a framework for looking at why bioethics 
appears to lend itself to universal application and a process called “democratization.” I 
have also examined the particular historical context that helps the EU construe Serbia as 
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in need of bioethics.  The larger story of promoting ethics in Serbia is how Serbian 
history, the history of bioethics, and the fact and value divide implicit in bioethics 
facilitate the presumed unproblematic movement of bioethics across cultural and political 
boundaries. Anna Tsing’s (2004) work has shown how ethnography is well suited to 
challenge the view of universals such as bioethics as moving across different grounds 
unimpeded by local context. Tsing shows that in practice the movement of phenomena 
such as bioethics does not proceed in this way: “How we run depends on what shoes we 
have to run in,” (2004:8). For Tsing, (2004) universals, such as bioethics, make sense and 
are effective only thorough this process of “friction,” the particular historical 
conjunctures in which bioethical practices hit new grounds such as Serbia. Thus, 
ethnographic research focused on practice can elicit what bioethics looks like in Serbia. 
Drawing on the STS scholarship, I have suggested that one way to undermine the 
enchanting universalism of bioethics implicit in the discussion of its principles would be 
to include the material and the non-human in our study of ethics. My future ethnographic 
research in Serbia would look at bioethics in practice by engaging particular medical 
technologies and the nature-culture assemblages they involve. This, I hope, will give 
bioethics in Serbia more “friction.” 
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